

Entanet Technical Services



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Flexible

Reliable

Successful

Professional

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Date: 20th September 2006

Incident Date: 18th Sept 2006 17.50hrs – 18.05hrs, 19th Sept 2006 01.30hrs – 11.30hrs & 19th Sept 2006 18.00 & 20.15hrs

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Introduction:

The purpose of this document is to inform and reassure all customers and partners affected by the network issues experienced on the evening of 18th September and on the morning of the 19th September.

Details of fault:

Initial network problems were experienced early evening on Monday 18th September 2006, with network connectivity being lost for a short period of time from approximately 17.50hrs to 18.05hrs. During this time, any packets routed via our London ring experienced severe delays with high levels of packet loss being reported.

This issue appeared to correct itself, although our engineers continued to monitor and investigate the issue; however no concrete evidence of a problem or resolution was discovered.

Issues appeared to resurface at approximately 01.30hrs however was intermittent in nature. Following diagnostic work the router Telehouse-east border, was deemed to be causing the issues at hand. Unfortunately, for a period, we were unable to log in to the router as the CPU utilisation was at 100%. Work was carried out to reduce load to this device and a login was attained. Once able to login our engineers removed all extra functions performed by the router, leaving it to concentrate on routing packets over the London ring. This was achieved at approximately 10.00hrs. Work continued to identify the erroneous function, until it was determined that a 2Gb layer 3 port channel appeared to be at fault. This port channel combined two 1Gb links and hence this was split to provide 1Gb of connectivity between the two routers.

The network was then monitored to ensure functionality, however processor usage continued to rise; therefore the second link was brought back in to service and the first removed. This stabilised the network and led to the diagnostic of a faulty Gbic card. This will be replaced at a future point in time with suitable notification. This issue was cleared at approximately 11.30hrs.

As an addition to this, we have since seen two instances of OSPF flapping. This is not directly linked to the issues seen with the Gbic card and current thinking suggests that this is as a result of a sustained attack on one element of our network. We are able to maintain service during this suspected attack and do not expect further issues.

